An unexpected contact on LinkedIn. A proposal of work from a recruiter, most likely a female agent, based in China. The chance to earn perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of geopolitical analyses for a firm from China peppered with confidential or “insider” information. Compensation in digital currency or cash preferred.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that something about this approach would be suspicious. However, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency continues to view it worthwhile to use recruitment consultants to attempt this – prompting the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Large-Scale Approaches on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 Ken McCallum stated Chinese agents were contacting UK citizens on the platform on an unprecedented level, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, attempting to obtain political, commercial, defense and scientific secrets. But a new campaign aimed at politicians and parliament has led the intelligence service to take further action.
A spying warning was issued on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to contact Members of Parliament, peers, their staffers, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might provide information.
Security Approach and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency was aware its advisory document would leak once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media helps the wider public better identify interactions with a deceptive purpose.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around parliament, although that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The agency wants people in public life to understand that simply because interactions on professional networks are less overtly risky as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Additionally, the domestic spy agency understood to have been responding to any specific incident in the legislature, although the recent actions does come after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend another person on a legal detail in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for China – a charge they denied – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Updated Laws and China's Long-Term Goals
The law has since been updated, and the MI5 slide contains a note of its successor: “Those engaging in espionage activity risk substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if somebody participates in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, though, is what China has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have limited access of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs even less. But Beijing is particularly focused in parliament: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Digital Threats
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Autocratic regimes like China’s export information gathering techniques and the scale of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was occasionally assessed that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity involved in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop contacts over the long term and at times even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “China has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be of value,” security minister a government official informed parliamentarians on this week, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in an individual quickly marginal becomes important.
Another way to consider the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the Western nations at a level below the point of outright war. China has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in relentless attempts to identify covert sources on British democracy online because it wants to be challenging, to demonstrate influence and because it can.